A New Direction? Yes. Legalization? No. Drawing on Evidence to Determine Where to Go in Drug Policy by Sabet, Kevin A.
SABET (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2013 2:18 PM 
 
[1153] 
KEVIN A. SABET* 
A New Direction? Yes. Legalization? 
No. Drawing on Evidence to 
Determine Where to Go in Drug 
Policy 
Introduction .................................................................................... 1154 
I.  Legalization Would Increase Drug Use, and Thus Harm .... 1156 
II.  Public Budgets Will Suffer, Not Gain, from Drug 
Legalization and Taxation ................................................... 1157 
III.  Legalization of Drugs Would Not Get Rid of the 
Underground Market ........................................................... 1159 
IV.  Legalization Would Not Dramatically Reduce the Number 
of People in Prison or Jail—and May Increase Criminal 
Justice Involvement ............................................................. 1160 
A. State and Federal Prisons ............................................. 1161 
B. Local Jails ..................................................................... 1162 
C. Arrests .......................................................................... 1163 
V.  Neither the Netherlands nor Portugal Offers the United 
States Models for Drug Policy ............................................ 1164 
A. Is Portugal a Model? If So, of What? ........................... 1165 
1. Decriminalization or Something Else? ................... 1165 
2. What Has Been the Outcome of Portugal’s 
Policy? .................................................................... 1167 
B. Holland’s Dramatic About-Face .................................. 1169 
	
* Director of the Drug Policy Institute and Assistant Professor in the Division of 
Addiction Medicine, University of Florida; Ph.D., Social Policy, Oxford University 
(Marshall Scholar); Senior Policy Advisor in the Obama Administration’s Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, 2009–2011; co-founder, with Patrick J. Kennedy, of Project 
SAM (Smart Approaches to Marijuana). 
SABET (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2013  2:18 PM 
1154 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 1153 
VI.  American-Style Legalization Would Mean Promotion, 
Advertising, and a Denial of Harms: Alcohol and Tobacco 
Are a Case in Point .............................................................. 1173 
VII.  Prohibition or Legalization Are Not the Only Two Policy 
Choices for Marijuana ......................................................... 1174 
VIII . Can Drug Users Be Forced to Stop Using Drugs? .............. 1175 
A. Drug Courts .................................................................. 1175 
B. Coerced Abstinence ..................................................... 1177 
Conclusion ...................................................................................... 1178 
INTRODUCTION 
t has been almost a hundred years since President Taft discussed 
the “special necessity” for federal anti-drug legislation. In many 
ways, he was echoing prominent voices of the time, including this 
representative of the American Medical Association: 
There are few if any subjects regarding which legislation is in a 
more chaotic condition than the laws designed to minimize the 
drug-habit evil. . . . In many of the states anti-narcotic laws are so 
comprehensive that practically every retail druggist would be 
subject to fine or imprisonment were an attempt made to enforce the 
legislation ostensibly in force, while in other states the laws are so 
burdened with exceptions and provisos as practically to nullify 
every effort to control the traffic in narcotic drugs.1 
The United States spends about $13 billion a year in health, 
criminal justice, and other costs to reduce drug use and its 
consequences. About eight percent of Americans are regular illicit 
drug users, compared to twenty-seven percent of tobacco smokers and 
fifty-two percent of alcohol consumers. But we are left with an illegal 
drug market that generates about $15 to $30 billion in illicit revenues, 
destructive violence both at home and abroad, and an underground 
criminal syndicate that gains new recruits every year. 
Methods to control drug use and judge policy effectiveness remain 
highly polarized. Beliefs about the success of U.S. policy to control 
the use and harms of illicit drugs, however, are highly polarized. 
Many laud current anti-drug policy, noting that steady declines of 
drug use have been achieved since the 1980s, according to data from 
	
1 DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 96 (3d 
ed. 1999) (quoting Martin I. Wilbert from a 1912 compilation of state laws on habit-
forming drugs). 
I
SABET (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2013  2:18 PM 
2013] A New Direction? Yes. Legalization? No. Drawing on Evidence to 1155 
Determine Where to Go in Drug Policy 
school and household surveys.2 These declines were preceded by 
government spending on programs aimed at reducing drug supply and 
demand.3 Conversely, others have cited the harms of drug policies 
themselves as a perverse effect of increased government 
intervention.4 Harms resulting from escalated rates of imprisonment, 
the reduction of civil liberties, and the nexus between infectious 
diseases and injection drug use have led to increasing calls for a 
radical restructuring of American drug policy.5 
The reality is that our ability as scientists to predict how policy 
changes will affect drug markets, drug use, and related problems is 
quite limited.6 Furthermore, most policy alternatives generate 
incommensurable outcomes (e.g., more dependence but less crime), 
and judging whether those trade-offs are favorable or not in the 
aggregate inevitably involves value judgments, not just dispassionate 
science.7 
In essence, honest drug policy analysis forces us to draw on limited 
evidence and decide what matters more. Since the recent discourse in 
the United States has shifted considerably toward legalizing drugs, 
this Article will examine some key premises of support for 
legalization. Readers can decide for themselves if the data is 
convincing enough to resist such a policy change or not. My take is 
that while the current drug control system is not perfect, it is much 
	
2 A sixty-six percent reduction in secondary school reported drug use and a fifty percent 
reduction in reported prevalence in the adult population from 1979 to 1993. OFFICE OF 
APPLIED STUDIES, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE ADVANCE REPORT 
#18 (1997), SAMSHA, available at http://www.samhsa.gov/data/nhsda/ar18t014.htm#A1 
(last updated June 16, 2008) (using data in Figure 4. Past Month Illicit Drug Use by Age: 
1979–1995). 
3 See James A. Inciardi, American Drug Policy: The Continuing Debate, in THE DRUG 
LEGALIZATION DEBATE 4–5 (James A. Inciardi ed., 2d ed. 1999); Herbert D. Kleber & 
James A. Inciardi, Clinical and Societal Implications of Drug Legalization, in SUBSTANCE 
ABUSE: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK 855, 860 (Joyce H. Lowinson et al. eds, 3d ed. 
1997); WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO 
WIN AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 180–85 (1996). 
4 See Ethan A. Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs, 
Consequences, and Alternatives, in 245 SCIENCE 939, 940 (1989); Kurt L. Schmoke, 
Decriminalizing Drugs: It Just Might Work–And Nothing Else Does, WASH. POST, May 
15, 1988, at B1. 
5 See Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 943–46; Schmoke, supra note 4, at B1. 
6 See Letter from Jonathan Caulkins & Kevin A. Sabet, to Editor, The Lancet (May 8, 
2009) (on file with author), available at http://www.ibhinc.org/pdfs/CaulkinsSabet.pdf. 
7 See ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES: LEARNING FROM 
OTHER VICES, TIMES AND PLACES 319–25 (2001). 
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more desirable than legalization, which needlessly puts our public 
health and safety at risk.8 
I 
LEGALIZATION WOULD INCREASE DRUG USE, AND THUS HARM 
In 2010, when a team of five RAND researchers analyzed 
California’s 2010 effort to legalize marijuana, they concluded that the 
pre-tax price of the drug could plummet (as much as eighty percent) 
and therefore marijuana consumption could increase.9 This was based 
on a scenario where the federal government did not intervene and 
indoor home-production would be allowed. That sharp drop in price 
complicates any attempts to predict the actual revenues that will result 
from marijuana taxes. Furthermore, the fall in price will hinder efforts 
to collect those revenues as a black market springs up to take 
advantage of the gap between the taxed price of pot and the real 
production cost of pot.10  
This corroborated everything economics has taught us about how 
price correlates with use (and why Big Tobacco and the Liquor Lobby 
fight price hikes aggressively). There is strong evidence to indicate 
that rates of drug use are inversely proportional to the price of drugs. 
For example, Americans who came of age in the 1980s were 
significantly more likely to initiate marijuana use than those in the 
1990s, when price increased. The case is the same for adults and 
marijuana use; fewer people use marijuana when the price is higher.11 
Why would the price of drugs fall so dramatically? Drugs are 
inherently not expensive; both cocaine and heroin are agricultural 
products that require minimal and inexpensive chemical processing to 
produce the street form of the drugs, and marijuana is strictly 
agricultural.12 But producing, manufacturing, distributing, and 
purchasing illegal drugs are inherently risky, and so people have to be 
paid for that risk. One of the principle purposes of prohibition is to 
	
8 An important caveat is that even though I may think legalization is undesirable, we 
should recognize that the effect of marijuana legalization would be very different than 
cocaine or methamphetamine legalization. 
9 BEAU KILMER ET AL., RAND CORP., ALTERED STATE? ASSESSING HOW MARIJUANA 
LEGALIZATION IN CALIFORNIA COULD INFLUENCE MARIJUANA CONSUMPTION AND 
PUBLIC BUDGETS 2 (2010). 
10 See id. at 15. 
11 WILLIAM RHODES ET AL., ILLICIT DRUGS: PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND AND 
SUPPLY 43–45 (2001). 
12 See id. at vi. 
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increase the price of a drug that would otherwise be cheap. This 
makes them less attractive to users who, as just discussed, are 
sensitive to price. Drugs are expensive because of the risk producers 
and traffickers take to get their product to market, and because lower-
level dealers are also trying to make a profit, further raising the price. 
In addition, cocaine and heroin are not produced in the United States, 
therefore increasing the price because of the necessary trafficking.13 
II 
PUBLIC BUDGETS WILL SUFFER, NOT GAIN, FROM DRUG 
LEGALIZATION AND TAXATION 
Many legalization advocates urge the government to “tax the hell 
out of” drugs,14 in order to pay for the assumed increased use and 
addiction costs. That way, new users will be deterred from starting 
because the price would be out of reach. The most vulnerable (i.e. the 
poor) would benefit from high costs, too, since one might think that 
those with less disposable income can afford expensive drugs. 
Ironically, however, this scenario actually exacerbates some of the 
worst qualities of prohibition. High-cost drugs would ensure that an 
already well-established black market would remain largely in tact. If 
a person can buy cocaine for ten dollars an ounce from a dealer or go 
to a government-sponsored “drug store” for ten times that much, he or 
she would opt for the former scenario. Especially if drugs were still 
illegal for minors (no one has seriously proposed legalizing marijuana 
or cocaine for minors), a black market would still have reasons to 
linger. This is precisely what occurred in Canada when it imposed 
steep taxes on cigarettes.15 In fact, today there is a thriving black 
market for the highly taxed cigarettes in certain parts of the United 
States as criminals smuggle packs of cigarettes from lower-taxed 
states to those with higher taxes. For example, New York has the 
highest tax on cigarettes in the country ($4.35 per pack, with an 
additional $1.50 in New York City).16 As a result, it has the highest 
	
13 See id. at 19, 22. 
14 Andy Ivens, ‘Legalize It, Control It and Tax the Livin’ Hell Out of It,’ THE 
PROVINCE, Nov. 11, 2007, available at http://www.canada.com/theprovince/news/story 
.html?id=cdf9aed6-718c-4991-8328-2475bfda76e6 (quoting former Vancouver, BC mayor 
Larry Campbell). 
15 See Phil Gunby, Canada Reduces Cigarette Tax to Fight Smuggling, 271 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 647 (1994). 
16 Joseph Henchman & Scott Drenkard, Fiscal Fact: Cigarette Taxes and Cigarette 
Smuggling by State, TAX FOUND., Jan. 10, 2013, at 1. 
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smuggling rates in the United States: 60.9% of cigarettes were 
smuggled into New York in 2011.17 After Massachusetts, Florida, and 
Utah raised their cigarette taxes, smuggling significantly increased.18 
California Board of Equalization officials have recently estimated that 
cigarette excise tax revenue evasion was $182 million in fiscal year 
2005–06.19 Around fifteen percent of all cigarettes sold in that state 
have somehow avoided the excise taxes in place on each pack to raise 
revenues for the state budget.20 This is lower than evasion rates in 
other countries, according to the Chief Economist for the California 
Board of Equalization.21 For example, about twenty-two percent of 
the United Kingdom’s domestic cigarette market now consists of 
smuggled cigarettes.22 In Canada, smuggled cigarettes represented 
about thirty-three percent of all domestic cigarette consumption at 
their peak.23 
In the United States, illegal drugs cost $193 billion per year in lost 
social costs.24 That number would no doubt increase under 
legalization and then have to be distributed to the new number of total 
drug users. Experience with taxing alcohol and tobacco shows that 
any attempt to pay for lost costs through taxes would be futile. Indeed 
the social costs of legalization (e.g., increased health costs, accidents, 
productivity losses) outweigh any possible tax that could be levied 
against the drug. Drugs that are already legal in the United States are 
a good example of what would happen if we thought we could reap 
the financial benefits of illegal drugs: For every one dollar of revenue 
they produce, they each cost the United States ten dollars in lost 
social costs.25 
	
17 Id. 
18 See id. at 2–3. 
19 REVENUE ESTIMATE: CIGARETTE AND TOBACCO PRODUCTS TAX EVASION, CAL. 
BD. OF EQUALIZATION 1 (2007), available at http://www.boe.ca.gov/pdf/cig-evasion-07 
.pdf. 
20 Joe Fitz, Chief Economist, Cal. Bd. of Equalization, PowerPoint presentation titled 
“California Cigarette Excise Tax Revenue Loss Estimate” at the Federation of Tax 
Administrators Revenue Estimating and Tax Research Conference (Sept. 17, 2007), 
available at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/meet/07rev_est/papers/fitz.pdf. 
21 See id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 NAT’L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT 
OF ILLICIT DRUG USE ON AMERICAN SOCIETY ix (2011). 
25 See OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION FACT 
SHEET 2 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/Fact 
_Sheets/marijuana_legalization_fact_sheet_3-3-11.pdf (discussing revenue from tobacco 
and alcohol offset by social costs of those substances); see also generally HENRICK 
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III 
LEGALIZATION OF DRUGS WOULD NOT GET RID OF THE 
UNDERGROUND MARKET 
One way to doom the black market for drugs is to beat the market 
down: Make drugs so cheap that the black market will eventually 
wither away in the face of legal competition. This would be a good 
economic model—if we were not concerned about the effects of drugs 
themselves. Certainly, drugs are dangerous because they rob people 
of making rational decisions. Cheap drugs would put a joint of 
marijuana well within the reach of a child’s daily allowance. 
Additionally, it would dissuade users from stopping (thus giving them 
a greater chance to become addicted) because of the cheap price. The 
American tobacco experience shows us that the price of drugs greatly 
influences a person’s decision to use. It is generally agreed that for 
every ten percent increase in cigarette price, overall smoking rates 
decline three to five percent and the number of children smoking is 
reduced by six to seven percent.26 Price increases are even more 
effective in reducing tobacco use rates among males, Hispanics, 
African Americans, and low-income smokers.27 
As the RAND research team scrutinized this argument, they 
discovered that marijuana exports are an important but not dominant 
source of revenue for Mexican drug cartels. RAND estimated that 
“15-26 percent is a more credible range of the share of drug export 
revenues attributable to marijuana” at that time.28 That works out to 
around $1.5 billion in cartel revenues coming from moving marijuana 
across the U.S. border for sale to wholesalers. By contrast, cocaine, 
heroin, and methamphetamine trafficking into the United States 
brought the cartels over $4 billion a year in revenues (combined total, 
	
J.HARWOOD, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UPDATING ESTIMATES OF THE 
ECONOMIC COSTS OF ALCOHOL ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES (2000); CAMPAIGN FOR 
TOBACCO FREE KIDS, TOLL OF TOBACCO IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2013), 
available at http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0072.pdf. 
26 CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO FREE KIDS, RAISING CIGARETTE TAXES REDUCES 
SMOKING, ESPECIALLY AMONG KIDS (AND THE CIGARETTE COMPANIES KNOW IT) 1 
(2012), available at http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0146.pdf. 
27 Id. 
28 BEAU KILMER ET AL., RAND CORP., REDUCING DRUG TRAFFICKING REVENUES 
AND VIOLENCE IN MEXICO: WOULD LEGALIZING MARIJUANA IN CALIFORNIA HELP? 3 
(2010). 
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not per drug).29 Consistent with this finding, the Mexican Institute of 
Competitiveness (IMCO), found that Mexican drug cartels could see 
their revenue drop between twenty and thirty-three percent. The lead 
author wrote later that he thought “that could be reasonably termed 
both significant and substantial . . . [however] . . . marijuana 
legalization would transform the Mexican drug trafficking 
organizations (in interesting and, as of yet, unpredictable ways), but it 
would certainly not eliminate them (not by itself, in any case).”30 
Where do the cartels derive most of their income if not from 
marijuana trafficking? They traffic cocaine, heroin, and 
methamphetamine into the United States. They smuggle migrants 
across the border and when migrants refuse to cooperate in cartel 
activities, they are often murdered, sometimes in mass killings, 
dozens at a time. These crime syndicates profit from extortion and 
kidnapping. They traffic in weapons and ammunition. In short, like 
the Mafia during alcohol Prohibition, the Mexican cartels have 
“diversified their portfolio” and spread their tentacles into a wide 
range of vices, and these activities have further escalated levels of 
violence as the various cartels compete to control turf.31 
IV 
LEGALIZATION WOULD NOT DRAMATICALLY REDUCE THE NUMBER 
OF PEOPLE IN PRISON OR JAIL—AND MAY INCREASE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT 
Critics of U.S. drug policy often claim that legalization would free 
up much needed prison space and police time.32 It is certainly true 
that the U.S. prison population has grown enormously over the past 
three decades. At the end of 2008, one in every 100 adults in this 
country was in the custody of a state or federal prison or local 
	
29 See ALEJANDRO HOPE & EDUARDO CLARK, IMCO, IF OUR NEIGHBORS LEGALIZE: 
SOME CLARIFICATIONS ABOUT THE IMCO FINDINGS 2 (2012), available at http://imco.org 
.mx/images/clarification.pdf. 
30 Comment of Alejandro Hope, Mark Kleiman, Polarization, Denial, and the 
Cannabis Debate, SAME FACTs (Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.samefacts.com/2012/12/drug   
-policy/polarization-denial-and-the-cannabis-debate/. 
31 Kevin A. Sabet, REEFER SANITY: SEVEN URBAN MYTHS ABOUT AMERICA’S MOST 
POPULAR ILLEGAL DRUG (forthcoming 2013). 
32 See generally Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 943; Ernest Drucker, Drug Law, Mass 
Incarceration, and Public Health, 91 OR. L. REV. 1097 (2013). 
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jail.33 But are we really throwing people in prison for lighting up a 
joint? Simply put: no. 
A. State and Federal Prisons 
The U.S. prison population is falling.34 What do drugs have to do 
with it? To understand who comprises America’s incarcerated 
population, we must first examine state prisons, which house the 
majority of the country’s prison population. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics state that the largest prison system in 
the United States, the state system, had 1,410,901 prisoners in 2009.35 
Eighteen percent of state prisoners were there for drug offenses in 
2008.36 According to the most recent survey of inmates in state and 
federal correctional facilities, about three-quarters of state prisoners in 
for a drug conviction are there for drug trafficking, not for petty drug 
offenses.37 Drug offenders made up six percent of state prison 
inmates, and only one tenth of one percent (0.1%) of all state 
prisoners were sentenced for possession of marijuana with no prior 
record. In federal prisons, which hold thirteen percent of the total 
prison population, about half of the inmates were incarcerated for 
drug offenses. Most of these prisoners, 99.8%, were incarcerated not 
for possessing marijuana—or any other drug—they were sentenced 
on more serious drug trafficking charges or other offenses.38 Even 
when not differentiating between the most serious drug crimes, like 
large-scale trafficking, and lesser offenses, like marijuana possession, 
the data show that drug offenders account for only a small fraction of 
	
33 PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PRISON COUNT 2010, at 1 (2010) [hereinafter PEW 
PRISON COUNT], available at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2010 
/Pew_Prison_Count_2010.pdf. 
34 U.S. Prison Count Continues to Drop, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Mar. 8, 2013), 
http://www.pewstates.org/news-room/press-releases/us-prison-count-continues-to-drop-85 
899457496. 
35 PEW PRISON COUNT, supra note 33, at 1. 
36 See HEATHER C. WEST ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2009, 
at 7 (2010), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf (providing statistics that 
251,400 of 1,365,400 prisoners were sentenced for drug offenses). 
37 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF INMATES IN STATE AND FEDERAL 
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 1997, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies 
/2598 (last visited Apr. 16, 2013). 
38 See Jonathan P. Caulkins & Eric L. Sevigny, How Many People Does the U.S. 
Imprison for Drug Use, and Who Are They?, 32 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBLEMS 405, 425 
(2005) (“[T]he number of marijuana users in prison for their use is perhaps 800-2,300 
individuals or on the order of 0.1%-0.2% of all prison inmates.”). 
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the overall prison population. In their column one year ago, Marc 
Mauer and David Cole revealed that as of the mid-90s, drug offenses 
no longer drove prison growth.39 
The largest growth in state inmates between 1995 and 2001 was 
among violent offenders.40 They accounted for sixty-three percent of 
the growth; drug offenders accounted for only fifteen percent of the 
growth.41 
Additionally, even federal prisons are not overwhelmingly filled 
with drug offenders. In the federal system, there were 208,118 people 
in prison in 2009.42 Of this number, 45.7% were there for drug 
offences—this is down from sixty percent in 1995 and fifty-five 
percent in 2001.43 
B. Local Jails 
In July of 2004, the Bureau of Justice Statistics released, for the 
first time in six years, a profile of local jail inmates, covering the year 
2002.44 It revealed the number of inmates held for drug law violations 
rose by about 40,000 from 1996 to 2002, although the number of drug 
violations was still just under the number of violations for public 
order and violent offenses.45 They each hovered around twenty-five 
percent of all offenders (public order violations rose by 30,000; 
violent offenses rose by 24,000).46 And of the drug offenders in jails, 
they were about equally distributed for possession and trafficking 
(10.8% and 12.1%, respectively).47 A 40,000 rise in the number of 
drug violators, however, is no small number. This resulted because 
there was a steep increase in those six years in the time served for 
	
39 Marc Mauer & David Cole, Five Myths about Americans in Prison, WASH. POST 
(June 17, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-incarceration 
/2011/06/13/AGfIWvYH_story.html. 
40 See PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PRISONERS IN 2002, at 10 (2003), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p02.pdf. 
41 Id. 
42 WEST ET AL., supra note 36, at 2. 
43 See id. at 2, 33 (reporting 95,205 federal inmates imprisoned for drug offenses in 
2009); HARRISON & BECK, supra note 40, at 11 (reporting 52,782 out of 88, 658 federal 
inmates imprisoned for drug offenses in 1995, and 78,501 out of 142,766 federal inmates 
imprisoned for drug offenses in 2001). 
44 DORIS J. JAMES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROFILE OF JAIL INMATES, 2002, at 1 
(2004). 
45 See id. at 4, 10. 
46 Id. at 4. 
47 Id. at 3. 
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drug traffickers—not possessors—from twenty-nine to fifty months.48 
In fact, the average time drug possession inmates expected to serve in 
jail was six months, for traffickers it was sixteen months.49 
It appears, then, that the state and federal anti-drug effort does not 
target users or addicts, but rather large-scale traffickers and others 
involved with impacting the supply of drugs. Ironically, Daniel 
Polsby, who favors marijuana legalization, sums it up best when he 
writes: “Despite well-publicized declarations to the contrary, there is 
very little worthwhile evidence that the current prison population of 
drug offenders contains any appreciable fraction of temperamentally 
inert flower children, ensnared by happenstance in the war on 
drugs.”50 
C. Arrests 
Of course, prison time is not the only indicator of entry into the 
criminal justice system. Arrests are unpleasant, especially if you are 
detained in a local jail, and they count against someone when getting 
a job or accessing social benefits. The total number of arrests for drug 
offenses in 2010 hovered at approximately 1.6 million.51 Of course, 
the term “arrest” itself could mean very different things, including a 
citation (ticket) or summons—the former is often invoked for simple 
marijuana possession. Arrest, per se, is an arbitrary term with 
different applications throughout the country. Additionally, if one 
person is arrested for multiple violations simultaneously, only the 
“most serious” offense is reported to the FBI52—causing significant 
undercount or overcount (whichever you prefer) for actual drug 
arrests. In other words, someone pulled over for reckless driving 
would only be cited for drug possession if drugs were found during 
the traffic stop. So drug arrests are often incidental to other crimes.53 
	
48 Id. at 5. 
49 Id. 
50 Daniel D. Polsby, Ending the War on Drugs and Children, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 537, 
542–43 (1997). 
51 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009: ARRESTS 1 
(2010), available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/documents/arrestmain.pdf. 
52 See Crime in the United States 2011: Persons Arrested, FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the  
-u.s.-2011/persons-arrested/persons-arrested (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
53 See PETER REUTER ET AL., ASSESSING THE CRACK-DOWN ON MARIJUANA IN 
MARYLAND 2 (2001), available at http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/md_mj_crack 
down.pdf. 
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Finally, looking at our legal drugs is again useful. A fact most 
people do not know is that alcohol, not crack or heroin, or even 
marijuana, is responsible for over 2.2 million arrests every year.54 
That is 700,000 more arrests than for all illegal drugs combined.55 
The reason for this is because alcohol is used so much more than our 
illegal drugs and people are being arrested for violating liquor laws, 
driving while intoxicated, and public drunkenness (the 2.2 million 
number does not include violent crimes that involve alcohol use). If 
drugs were legal and more people used, we would have more people 
driving high, manufacturing drugs in their own homes to avoid 
government regulations, using underage, and violating all sorts of 
new regulations. 
V 
NEITHER THE NETHERLANDS NOR PORTUGAL OFFERS THE UNITED 
STATES MODELS FOR DRUG POLICY56 
For decades, American tourists and other visitors knew the Dutch 
city of Amsterdam as the “San Francisco of Europe,” a designation 
that harkened back to the 1960s “Summer of Love” in San Francisco 
and reflected Amsterdam’s permissive attitudes toward marijuana. 
The Dutch city emerged as a magnet for foreign drug tourists seeking 
legal highs in coffee shops licensed to sell marijuana. 
 This Dutch experiment lasted for almost forty years, from 1976 
when the possession and sale of up to thirty grams of marijuana was 
decriminalized57 to 2011 when awareness of a new reality about pot 
began to dawn on Dutch policymakers and public health authorities. 
This new awareness emerged because selective breeding has made 
Dutch marijuana so powerful in its effects that psychiatric problems 
are cropping up in growing numbers of users.58 So in October 2011, 
Holland reclassified strong cannabis (THC of about fifteen percent or 
higher) as a “hard” drug, putting it in the same category as cocaine, 
	
54 See Crime in the United States 2011: Table 29, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables 
/table-29 (last visited Apr. 15, 2013) (reporting 1,215,077 arrests for diving under the 
influence, 500,648 arrests for liquor law violations, and 534,218 arrests for drunkenness). 
55 See id. 
56 SABET, supra note 31. 
57 Robert J. MacCoun, What Can We Learn from the Dutch Cannabis Coffeeshop 
System?, 106 ADDICTION 1899, 1899 (2011). 
58 See Selena Chavis, Cannabis Use Linked to Increased Risk for Mental Health Issues, 
PSYCHCENTRAL (Oct. 12, 2010), http://psychcentral.com/news/2010/10/08/cannabis-use   
-increases-risk-for-mental-health-issues-2/19425.html. 
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and proposed a law banning foreign tourists from the nation’s 700 
marijuana coffee shops.59 
Legalization proponents on this side of the Atlantic have been 
holding the Dutch experience up for years as a model of rational 
marijuana policy. Indeed, the Dutch case presents an instructive 
model for us—but not for the reasons the pro-marijuana movement 
would have us believe. The about-face in Dutch attitudes and policies 
provides a cautionary tale for us in the United States as various states 
consider relaxing their drug laws. 
But before examining the Dutch experience in more detail, let’s 
first look at a more recent European experiment, which is also at the 
heart of this urban myth—the case of Portugal. 
A. Is Portugal a Model? If So, of What? 
No single country in the last decade has had its drug policy held up 
on the pro-legalization soapbox more than Portugal. That’s because in 
2001 the nation passed a law formally decriminalizing all drugs, 
including marijuana, heroin, and cocaine. When the law was first 
announced, it sounded extreme on its face and was widely 
characterized as legalization. Drug legalization advocates cheered. 
But just a little bit of digging shows that the Portuguese experience 
has been vastly exaggerated, twisted, and misused in two principal 
ways. First, Portugal’s policy was decidedly not a form of 
legalization. Second, the outcomes of the new Portuguese approach 
are mixed. 
1. Decriminalization or Something Else? 
Since 2001, drug users in Portugal have been sent to “dissuasion 
panels” of social workers, attorneys, and psychiatrists, called 
“Commissions for the Dissuasion of Drug Addiction” (Comissões 
para a Dissuasão da Toxicodependência–CDT). Members of the CDT 
team assess drug users and refer them to brief health interventions or 
treatment, if necessary. The policy is in fact similar to the way many 
European countries have long treated people caught for low-level 
drug possession. One might even argue that the Portuguese approach 
is similar to the U.S. drug court or diversion system. One thing is for 
	
59 See Stephanie Darrall, Dutch Government Bans Coffee-Shops from Selling ‘Skunk,’ 
MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 8, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2046768/Dutch      
-government-bans-coffee-shops-selling-skunk.html. 
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sure: in no way does the law resemble legalization, or even many 
reformers’ vision of true decriminalization under which users would 
be slapped with a small (usually uncollected) fine and left alone. 
In fact, prior to 2001, Portugal had rarely imprisoned drug users at 
all. But because of relatively high rates of HIV and other drug-related 
problems, authorities felt compelled to try a new policy that amped up 
treatment and intervention strategies and formally ended any 
possibility of jail time. In a 2011 profile of the country and its drug 
law experiment, The New Yorker magazine observed: “Portuguese 
leaders, flailing about and desperate for change, took an unlikely 
gamble: they passed a law that made Portugal the first country to fully 
decriminalize drug use.”60 
Under the new law, drug possession in small amounts became an 
administrative offense rather than a criminal one. People who are 
caught using drugs in a public place and/or possessing a small amount 
of any drug (up to ten days’ worth of personal use) are referred to 
CDTs. A CDT consists of a three-member administrative panel, 
which decides if the referred individual gets an intervention, 
treatment, a fine, or nothing at all. A person selling any drug, 
however, can still be arrested for trafficking, even if the amount in his 
or her possession is less than ten days’ worth. 
Portugal’s policy is a far cry from legalization, which implies the 
retail sale, commercial distribution, and production of drugs. But that 
did not stop the spin. Misleading headlines and blog posts abounded: 
“Ten Years Of Legalization Has Cut Portugal’s Drug Abuse Rate In 
Half,” “What Pot Legalization Looks Like: Portugal shows the best 
way to keep kids away from pot is to make it legal for everyone else,” 
and “What Happened After Portugal Made All Drugs Legal?” are just 
a few examples.61 
To legalization advocates, the details did not matter. They 
presented Portugal as a new frontier in legalization and argued that 
the United States would do well to follow. 
	
60 Michael Specter, Getting A Fix: Portugal Decriminalized Drugs a Decade Ago. 
What have we learned?, THE NEW YORKER, Oct.17, 2011, at 36. 
61 Trish Regan, What Pot Legalization Looks Like, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 2011, 
1:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/trish-regan/what-pot-legalization-loo_b_851 
550.html; Jacob Sloan, Ten Years of Legalization Has Cut Portugal’s Drug Abuse Rate in 
Half, DISINFORMATION (July 20, 2010), http://www.disinfo.com/2012/07/ten-years-of       
-legalization-has-cut-portugals-drug-abuse-rate-in-half/; What Happened After Portugal 
Made All Drugs Legal? HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/13 
/portugal-legal-drugs_n_897207.html (last updated Sept. 12, 2011). 
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2. What Has Been the Outcome of Portugal’s Policy? 
The first analysis on Portugal was done in 2009 by the Cato 
Institute, a libertarian U.S. think tank which has been on record for 
years favoring the legalization of all drugs.62 The Cato report, 
released in 2009, concluded that drug use had not increased under 
decriminalization, that drug-related deaths and HIV rates had fallen, 
and that generally, things were much better in that country because of 
the new policy.63 Immediately after the Cato report was released and 
its author went on a world tour promoting his findings, pro-drug 
lobby groups and legalization advocates touted Portugal as the model 
of drug policy for the United States. They propped up Portugal as an 
example of radical revolution in the decades-long drug wars. For 
example, headlines read “Portugal Drug Decriminalization: A 
Resounding Success,” “Drug Decriminalization Policy Pays Off,” and 
“5 Years After: Portugal’s Drug Decriminalization Policy Shows 
Positive Results.”64 
In 2011, The New Yorker was much more careful in its review of 
the law’s effects: “[T]here is much to debate about the Portuguese 
approach to drug addiction. Does it help people to quit, or does it 
transform them into more docile drug addicts, wards of an indulgent 
state, with little genuine incentive to alter their behavior?”65 So what 
is the straight truth about Portugal and its drug policy? In short, some 
use and harm levels went up, others went down. And it is 
questionable whether the policy that Portugal enacted is working as 
intended. 
Depending on which years, age groups, or outcomes one examines, 
the statistics on the impact of drug use change dramatically. The 
significance of Portugal’s experience and the impact of that country’s 
drug policy have been overstated in several ways. The European 
	
62 GLENN GREENWALD, CATO INST., DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL: 
LESSONS FOR CREATING FAIR AND SUCCESSFUL DRUG POLICIES (2009). 
63 See id. at 16–18, 27–28. 
64 Glenn Greenwald, Drug Decriminalization Policy Pays Off, POLITICO (Oct. 14, 
2010, 4:46 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1010/43544.html; Tom Chivers, 
Portugal Drug Decriminalisation ‘A Resounding Success’: Will Britain Respond? No., 
THE TELEGRAPH, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tomchivers/100047485/portugal       
-drug-decriminalisation-a-resounding-success-will-britain-respond-no/ (last updated Sept. 
28, 2010); Brian Vastag, 5 Years After: Portugal’s Drug Decriminalization Policy Shows 
Positive Results, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.scientificamerican 
.com/article.cfm?id=portugal-drug-decriminalization. 
65 Specter, supra note 60, at 36. 
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Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), long 
considered the authority on drug statistics in Europe, compiled 
statistics showing an increase in lifetime prevalence rates for the use 
of cannabis, cocaine, amphetamines, ecstasy, and LSD between 2001 
and 2011.66 Those figures are for the general population of Portugal, 
ages fifteen to sixty-four years of age.67  The European School Survey 
Project on Alcohol and Other Drugs (ESPAD) survey of fifteen- and 
sixteen-year-olds shows an overall increase in the prevalence of 
marijuana use between 1999 to 2011, although there was an initial dip 
in use rates.68 Past-month prevalence for marijuana use in that age 
group went from five percent in 1999 to eight percent in 2003 to six 
percent in 2007 and finally up nine percent in 2011.69 EMCDDA 
concluded, “the most recent ESPAD study corroborates the findings 
of the [UN World Health Organization] study, showing increasing 
consumption of illicit substances [in Portugal] since 2006.”70 
Data on the number of drug-related deaths is mixed. Some sources 
point to an increase in deaths from 280 in 2001 to 314 in 2007.71 
Others point to different numbers. For example, data from the General 
Mortality Registry of the Statistics National Institute shows that 
twenty-six cases of drug-related deaths occurred in 2010.72 That 
represents fewer deaths than the twenty-seven cases reported in 2009 
and 2002 but is higher than the number of drug-related deaths 
reported in each of the years between 2003 and 2008.73 Clearly, it is a 
mixed picture. As Stanford University’s Dr. Keith Humphreys notes 
of the EMCDDA’s data, “Portugal decriminalized all drugs in 2001, 
and these factually accurate data can be used to prove that Portugal’s 
policy has been a complete success or a complete failure, assuming 
the analyst has no intellectual integrity.”74 
	
66 Country Overview: Portugal, EUROPEAN MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS AND DRUG 
ADDICTION, http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/country-overviews/pt#drd (last 
updated Oct. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Portugal Overview]. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Comment of Nigel Keegan, Drug Decriminalization in Portugal, BMJ (Oct. 5, 
2010), http://www.bmj.com/content/341/bmj.c4554?tab=responses. 
72 Portugal Overview, supra note 66. 
73 Id. 
74 Keith Humphreys, Scientific Proof that Drug Decriminalization in Portugal Saved 
Lives and Killed People, SAME FACTS (Oct. 18, 2010), http:// www.samefacts.com/2010 
/10/drug-policy/scientific-proof-that-drug-decriminalization-in-portugal-saved-lives-and    
-killed-people/. 
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With this evidence in hand, the EMCDDA concluded that under 
Portugal’s drug law, “[t]he country still has high levels of problem 
drug use and HIV infection, and does not show specific developments 
in its drug situation that would clearly distinguish it from other 
European countries that have a different policy.”75 The new policy, 
then, appeared to be neither novel nor a magic bullet. 
It is also highly debatable whether Portugal’s law has encouraged 
people with drug problems to seek treatment. As The New Yorker 
article pointed out, treatment facilities “became far more accessible 
just as the new law was passed.”76Any positive treatment trends and 
other claimed benefits seen since 2001 may simply be due to 
increases in treatment capacity and reach. We do not really know. 
Indeed, it appears that Portugal’s policy is not really a true 
decriminalization or legalization strategy. It is more of a treatment-or-
”dissuasion”-focused approach similar to those of Portugal’s 
European neighbors. 
While the Portuguese experience with drug policy reform extends 
beyond marijuana, the fact that pro-legalization advocates point to it 
as a successful model for North American pot legalization makes it 
highly relevant to this context. Close examination has demonstrated 
that drug legalization advocates in the United States are not 
strengthening their case by highlighting the Portuguese drug law 
model. 
B. Holland’s Dramatic About-Face 
A onetime poster child for legalization, Holland has experienced a 
dramatic about-face in its policies. The Dutch policy began in 1976, 
not as legalization, but as a non-enforcement policy on marijuana sale 
and use. The country has made it a practice to look the other way 
when marijuana is sold in coffee shops. When passing the 1976 law, 
Parliament removed penalties for the possession of thirty grams of 
marijuana or hashish, an amount that was thought to constitute the 
average pot user’s consumption over three months.77 
	
75 EUROPEAN MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS AND DRUG ADDICTION, DRUG POLICY 
PROFILES: PORTUGAL 24 (2011). 
76 Specter, supra note 60, at 44. 
77 Larry Collins, Holland’s Half-Baked Drug Experiment, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May/June 
1999, at 83. 
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In addition to this decriminalization of possession in small 
amounts, Dutch lawmakers authorized the sale of marijuana and 
hashish in special coffee shops licensed by the government. These 
shops could not sell more than thirty grams to any customer.78 The 
import, export, production, or sale of cannabis remained illegal 
outside of the coffee shops.79 
From 1976 to the early 1980s, there was little change in Dutch 
marijuana use levels. Then, when coffee shops started figuring out 
how much they could profit from the policy by attracting foreigners 
and advertising their products, the business climate changed. There 
was a tourism boom, and with the rise in advertising, coffee shops 
became a favorite destination for foreign tourists and Dutch residents 
alike. From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, the number of coffee 
shops selling pot quintupled.80 
In 1996, local communities throughout Holland were given the 
authority to decide whether coffee shops should be allowed within 
their jurisdictions.81 Since then, three quarters of the nearly 500 local 
communities in Holland have refused to allow coffee shops to operate 
within their borders at all.82 As a result, Amsterdam became home to 
one-third of all coffee shops in the country despite having only five 
percent of the country’s population.83 
But the black market sale of marijuana did not go away in areas 
with a high concentration of coffee shops legally selling pot. There 
are several reasons for this and all relate to the unfailing opportunism 
of black market sellers in exploiting the inevitable gaps left open in 
any regime of legal marijuana. For example, black market dealers 
take advantage of coffee shops not being open twenty-four hours a 
day to offer round-the-clock service. Black market sellers also target 
minors too young to legally enter coffee shops. Additionally, while 
there are limits on the amount of pot a coffee shop visitor can 
purchase, there is no limit on how much a customer can buy from a 
black market dealer in a single transaction.84 All of these factors 
	
78 See MacCoun, supra note 57, at 1899. 
79 Collins, supra note 77, at 83. 
80 See MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 7, at 241, 250. 
81 Dirk Korf, Chapter 9: An Open Front Door: The Coffee Shop Phenomenon in the 
Netherlands, in A EMCDDA, A CANNABIS READER: GLOBAL ISSUES AND LOCAL 
EXPERIENCES 137, 142 (2008). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 See id. at 150. 
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combined create an enforcement problem for Holland’s criminal 
justice system. 
Predictably, as pot use was normalized by coffee shops, an increase 
in marijuana use among Holland’s young people occurred. Rates of 
youth marijuana use more than doubled from the mid-1980s to the 
mid-1990s. An analysis by a pair of researchers who are sympathetic 
to marijuana legalization and decriminalization found that the 
percentage of eighteen- to twenty-year-olds reporting marijuana use 
went from fifteen percent in 1984 to forty-four percent in 1996, an 
increase of 300% for that age group.85 The Dutch always had lower 
rates of youth marijuana use than the United States, but since the mid-
1990s, Dutch rates have caught up to their American counterparts. 
Marijuana potency has also risen dramatically over the last decade 
or so. The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction has posted statistics showing that THC concentrations in 
marijuana sold in coffee shops more than doubled between 1999 and 
2004, from an average of 8.6% in 1999 to more than 20% in 2004.86 
As potency levels escalated, users began developing a tolerance for 
the drug, requiring increasingly higher levels of THC to get the same 
high—a vicious cycle that accelerates the development of 
dependency. Dutch citizens now are more likely to be admitted to 
treatment centers for marijuana use than citizens of any other 
European country.87 
Holland holds yet another distinction that the pro-pot movement 
might wish would go away. Foreign Affairs, published by the United 
States-based Council on Foreign Relations, did an analysis of 
Holland’s drug experiment and described how that country’s lenient 
laws and status as “the drugs capital of western Europe” had turned it 
into “a magnet for . . . criminal types.”88 And we are not just talking 
about marijuana trafficking. Law enforcement authorities in both 
France and Britain estimated that eighty percent of the heroin used or 
seized in those countries passed through or was temporarily 
warehoused in Holland.89 Dutch traffickers manufactured most of the 
	
85 MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 7, at 257. 
86 Korf, supra note 81, at 151. 
87 See Table TDI-3: New Clients Entering Treatment by Primary Drug, 1997 to 2007: 
Part (iv) New Cannabis Clients by Country and Year of Treatment, EUROPEAN 
MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS AND DRUG ADDICTION, http://www.emcdda.europa 
.eu/stats09/tditab3d (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
88 Collins, supra note 77, at 83–84. 
89 Id. at 83. 
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amphetamines and ecstasy pills consumed in Europe.90 According to 
a British customs official, “Holland has become the place for drug 
traffickers to work . . . it’s an environment which is relatively trouble-
free from a criminal’s point of view.”91 To their credit, Dutch law 
enforcement have begun to fund enforcement operations and 
intelligence at a much higher rate now than in the past.92 
Dutch officials did not predict these effects of marijuana 
legalization. Nor did they predict the sharp increase in use rates, the 
higher rates of dependency, the significant increase in treatment 
admission rates, or all the other social and public health problems that 
have emerged in Holland over the years. 
Observing these effects, however, did eventually drive Dutch 
lawmakers to reverse their policy. In response to these growing 
problems, Dutch officials initiated a turnaround, scaling back lenient 
marijuana laws in late 2011, banning tourists from going to the coffee 
shops selling pot, closing many of the shops, and reclassifying high-
THC marijuana as a hard drug alongside heroin.93 As a Daily Mail 
commentator observed in 2011, Dutch physicians and lawmakers had 
begun to recognize that pot “is very dangerous psychiatrically. Its 
frequent use leads to an increased incidence of hospitalisation for 
psychotic breakdown.”94 
Not surprisingly, coffee-shop owners have come together as the 
Cannabis Retailers’ Association to take legal action against these 
changes. They argue, among other things, that these legal changes 
discriminate against foreigners who would no longer be able to 
consume pot in their coffee shops. In April 2012, a judge in Holland 
upheld the new law. Appeals could drag the legal process out for 
years to come since the cannabis retailers have vowed to take this 
issue to the European Court of Human Rights.95 
	
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 See, e.g., Higher Sentences for Drugs and Drink-Related Crime, DUTCH NEWS (Mar. 
25, 2011), http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2011/03/higher_sentences_for_drugs 
_and.php. 
93 Dutch to Classify Super Strong Marijuana Alongside Heroin, DUTCH NEWS (Nov. 
20, 2012), http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2012/11/dutch_to_classify_super 
_strong.php. 
94 Robert LeFever, Even the Dutch Think Skunk Drives You Mad, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 
11, 2011, 9:10 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2047750/The-grass            
-greener-Holland.html. 
95 See Netherlands Judge Backs Cafe Cannabis Ban, BBC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17865151. 
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Certainly, we can learn from Portugal about its public health 
oriented approach using administrative sanctions and Holland’s 
warnings about the commercialization of marijuana. But neither 
Holland nor Portugal represents a successful model of legalization. As 
argued here, Portugal’s policy can hardly be called a legalization 
regime. And, in any case, the outcomes of Portuguese drug reform are 
far from resoundingly positive. The Dutch experience, on the other 
hand, offers a clear warning of the many harms that marijuana 
legalization can inflict. In the United States, a country obsessed with 
commercialization in the name of the First Amendment, legalization 
is sure to be an even riskier proposition. 
VI 
AMERICAN-STYLE LEGALIZATION WOULD MEAN PROMOTION, 
ADVERTISING, AND A DENIAL OF HARMS: ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO 
ARE A CASE IN POINT 
According to internal documents the government forced Big 
Tobacco to release during its historic court settlement, Big Tobacco is 
ready to pounce on the golden opportunity of marijuana legalization: 
The use of marijuana . . . has important implications for the tobacco 
industry in terms of an alternative product line . . . [We] have the 
land to grow it, the machines to roll it and package it, the 
distribution to market it. In fact, some firms have registered 
trademarks, which are taken directly from marijuana street jargon. 
These trade names are used currently on little-known legal products, 
but could be switched if and when marijuana is legalized. Estimates 
indicate that the market in legalized marijuana might be as high as 
$10 billion annually.96 
It is no wonder that the parent company of Phillip Morris, Altria, 
recently bought the domain names “AltriaCannabis.com” and 
“AltriaMarijuana.com.”97 If this sounds frightening, it should: Big 
Tobacco tried for decades to conceal the harms of the drug tobacco 
and millions of lives were lost as a result. We are naïve to think that 
this wouldn’t happen with marijuana. 
	
96 Michael S. Rosenwald, The Year  is 2020: What’s Happening with Marijuana?, 
WASH. POST (2010 Oct. 31, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content 
/article/2010/10/22/AR2010102205573_2.html?sid=ST2010102805974 (quoting a report 
prepared by consultants for Brown & Williamson). 
97 See Andrew Allemann, Altria gearing up to sell marijuana?, DOMAIN NAME WIRE 
(Dec. 28, 2009), http://domainnamewire.com/2009/12/28/altria-gearing-up-to-smell           
-marijuana/. 
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When the “Winston Man,” model Dave Goerlitz, finished with a 
photo session for R. J. Reynolds one day, he asked the executives 
present if he could take home some props—a few cartons of 
cigarettes. He was surprised when the executives replied that they did 
not smoke. “Are you kidding?” one of the executives said. “We 
reserve that ‘right’ for the young, the poor, the black and the 
stupid.”98 Goerlitz, who was severely disabled in a stroke due to his 
tobacco use, now counsels kids on why smoking is dangerous. 
The Liquor Lobby is not much better. We know that even though 
today’s alcohol taxes are, adjusting for inflation, one-fifth of those 
during the Korean War—yes one-fifth—the lobby opposes any such 
increase.99 Of course, it also relies on the heaviest drinkers for their 
profits, meaning that it has major incentives to encourage, not 
discourage, drinking among kids and adults alike. The industry also 
targets the poor, documented by the fact that liquor store outlets are 
far more prevalent in poorer neighborhoods of color than in white, 
upper-class areas.100 
Alcohol and tobacco are industries we should hardly hang our 
marijuana hat on. But as the examples of legal, addictive substances, 
they provide a cautious tale of legalization, American-style. 
VII 
PROHIBITION OR LEGALIZATION ARE NOT THE ONLY TWO POLICY 
CHOICES FOR MARIJUANA 
Though it is hard to hear over the shouting matches that 
characterize today’s drug policy debate, enforcement-heavy 
prohibition and lax legalization are thankfully not the only two 
choices we have for dealing with drugs. Hundreds of localities have 
implemented drug courts that combine treatment with regular testing 
as opposed to just prison alone. Probation programs that change 
behavior among drug users by enforcing modest rules have proven to 
be successful. But we can certainly do more. Increased education 
about today’s marijuana harms need to be amplified. Screenings for 
early marijuana abuse need to be more widespread within our health 
	
98 135 CONG. REC. S9,971 (daily ed. Aug. 3,1989) (statement of Dave Goerlitz), 
available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/action/document/page?tid=lpm40c00&page=1. 
99 See Mark A.R. Kleiman et al., Rethinking the War on Drugs, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (Apr. 22, 2012, 9:09 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303 
425504577353754196169014.html. 
100 See Rhonda Jones-Webb et al., Alcohol and Malt Liquor Availability and Promotion 
and Homicide in Inner Cities, 43 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 159, 170 (2008). 
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care system. Localities are also realizing that we cannot just arrest our 
way out of our marijuana use and saddle users with lifelong records 
that inhibit their ability to get their life together. Sadly, however, 
the black-and-white thinking that plagues this issue betrays the fact 
that there are better ways than legalization or prohibition to deal with 
this complex health problem. 
VIII 
CAN DRUG USERS BE FORCED TO STOP USING DRUGS? 
The issue of coercion and abstinence is relevant in the drug policy 
discussion today because a growing number of drug courts and 
treatment and sanctions programs have emerged both in the United 
States and in Europe. These mechanisms use different tools of 
coercion—a jail sentence, usually—to lure drug users to change their 
behavior. Noncompliance (positive drug tests) results in proceeding 
with the charges as if the user had not entered into the drug court. 
Drug courts have been positively shown to reduce crime, as opposed 
to offenders who receive probation alone.101 
At first read, the idea seems paradoxical: if addiction is beyond the 
addict’s control, since we classify it as a disease, then how can addicts 
just “change” their status from drug using to nondrug using? Not all 
drug users, though, are addicts. Many people can have trouble with 
drugs and not necessarily be addicted. These people may not 
necessarily need treatment to stop using drugs. Some, still, may be 
dependent or addicted, and require a more comprehensive treatment 
regimen. For both of these groups of drug users, coercion has shown 
to work remarkably well to stop drug use. 
A. Drug Courts 
The National Association of Drug Court Professionals defines a 
drug court as “a special court that is given the responsibility to handle 
cases involving drug-using offenders through comprehensive 
supervision, drug testing, treatment services and immediate sanctions 
and incentives.”102 Drug courts offer nonviolent drug users the 
	
101 See ELIZABETH PIPER DESCHENES ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, AN 
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF DRUG TESTING AND TREATMENT INTERVENTIONS FOR 
PROBATIONERS IN MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA iv (1996). 
102 National Association of Drug Court Professionals: Information on Drug Courts, 
HOPENET, http://www.hopenetworks.org/addiction/DrugCourtInformation.htm (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
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chance to forgo formal criminal sanctions if they agree to enter into 
and complete a procedure of heavily monitored drug treatment and 
routine drug testing. A General Accounting Office (GAO) report from 
the U.S. government discovered that the average retention rate of drug 
court participants was a whopping seventy-one percent.103 The GAO 
report found that the longer the participation in the drug court, the 
more likely the outcome would be successful.104 Other studies 
looking at drug courts in Baltimore, Las Cruces, Portland, and various 
places in Florida have shown very promising results.105 
The first drug court emerged in the late 1980s in the Miami-Dade 
area of Florida as judges witnessed a new wave of cocaine use and the 
revolving door into the criminal justice system many drug users were 
participating in.106 As of September 2005, there were about 1,500 
working drug courts and another 550 in the planning stages in the 
United States.107 
Drug courts are an excellent alternative to traditional sentencing, 
yet, like all policy interventions, they do suffer from some limitations. 
First—and this may explain at least some of the success surrounding 
drug courts—the nature of drug courts could lead these programs to 
focus on the less-serious offenders, though many drug courts now 
take serious offenders. Second, another limitation is that drug courts 
can suffer from a lack of judges and other necessary stakeholder 
investment. Third, since drug court participation is voluntary, many 
	
103 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG COURTS: OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, 
CHARACTERISTICS, AND RESULTS 11 (1997). 
104 See id. at 117. 
105 See generally MICHAEL W. FINIGAN, MULTNOMAH CNTY. DEP’T OF CMTY. CORR., 
AN OUTCOME PROGRAM EVALUATION OF THE MULTNOMAH COUNTY S.T.O.P. DRUG 
DIVERSION PROGRAM (1998); JOHN S. GOLDKAMP & DORIS WEILAND, NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF DADE COUNTY’S FELONY DRUG COURT (1993); W. 
Clinton Terry III, Chapter 4: Broward County’s Dedicated Drug Treatment Court: From 
Post-Adjudication to Diversion, in THE EARLY DRUG COURTS: CASE STUDIES IN 
INNOVATION (W. Clinton Terry III ed., 1999); James F. Breckenridge et al., Drunk 
Drivers, DWI “Drug Court” Treatment, and Recidivism: Who Fails?, 2 JUSTICE RES. & 
POL’Y 87 (2000); Denise C. Gottfredson & M. Lyn Exum, The Baltimore City Drug 
Court: One-Year Results from a Randomized Study, 39 J. RES. CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 
337 (2002); Denise C. Gottfredson et al., Effectiveness of Drug Treatment Courts: 
Evidence from a Randomized Trial, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 171 (2002). 
106 See History: Justice Professionals Pursue a Vision, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT 
PROF’LS, http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/drug-court-history (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2013). 
107 See BJA DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE PROJECT, SUMMARY OF DRUG COURT 
ACTIVITY BY STATE AND COUNTY (2007), available at http://spa.american.edu/justice 
/publications/us_drugcourts.pdf. 
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offenders skip out on this opportunity and take their chances with the 
legal system. Finally, drug courts require treatment capacity, which 
has proven (unacceptably) frustratingly difficult to expand for a 
variety of reasons (including cost, political will, public support, and 
resource capacity). These limitations should in no way imply that 
drug courts are not an innovative, successful, and positive drug policy 
intervention. They, like other similar interventions, can always benefit 
from improvement. 
B. Coerced Abstinence 
Traditional sentencing does not have a brilliant track record in 
healing drug users and stopping them from committing criminal 
behavior. Coerced abstinence acts as an alternative to both traditional 
sentencing and drug courts. It combines treatment and sanctions 
through conducting swift, certain, non-severe sanctions for drug 
violations, while offering formal treatment for those who need it or 
want it. Using drug testing as the centerpiece of the program, coerced 
abstinence promises to reduce recidivism among probationers and 
reduce the time offenders spend behind bars—two important micro 
harms of drug policy. 
Opponents of coerced abstinence, or “treatment and sanctions” as it 
is sometimes called, reflect that the premise of such a program 
ignores the fact that drug addiction is a disease, a wholly medical 
condition that takes away the capacity of its victims to make any kind 
of rational choice. In many cases, that is right: addiction changes 
brain chemistry and alters one state of mind so much sometimes that 
the person becomes unrecognizable and commits crimes they would 
otherwise not have done. However, there are some people who 
change their behavior in the face of swift and certain penalties: a 
partner leaving them, an employer firing them, or a landlord evicting 
them, for example. Why not try the same kind of approach with drug 
users, especially heavy users, most of whom commit crimes and cause 
disturbances in the community? 
A coerced abstinence program may look like this:108 
(1) Probationers and parolees are screened for cocaine, heroin, or 
methamphetamine use, employing a combination of records 
review and chemical tests. 
	
108 See generally FRIENDS OF HOPE, http://www.hopehawaii.net (last visited Apr. 15, 
2013). 
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(2) Those identified as users, either at the beginning of their terms 
or by random testing thereafter, are subject to twice-weekly 
drug tests. They may choose any two days of the week and 
times of day for their tests, as long as the two chosen times are 
separated by at least seventy-two hours. That means that there 
is effectively no “safe window” for undetected use. 
(3) Every positive test results in a brief (say, two-day) period of 
incarceration. 
(4) The sanction is applied immediately, and no official has the 
authority to waive or modify it. The offender is entitled to a 
hearing only on the question of whether the test result is 
accurate; the penalty itself is fixed. 
(5) Missed tests count as positive and a warrant is immediately 
issued. 
(6) After a period of no missed or positive tests, or alternatively 
achievement of some score on a point system, offenders are 
eligible for less frequent testing. Continued good conduct leads 
to removal to inactive status, with only random testing. 
Its proponents argue that coerced abstinence programs are 
favorable from a policy perspective because they are much cheaper 
than traditional treatment and may act as a wise “first-tier response” 
for drug users otherwise channeled into an over-run treatment 
system.109 
Since many drug offenders do not meet the criteria for dependence 
or abuse programs (one figure has it at forty percent),110 this program 
has many attractive qualities. It opens up treatment slots for those 
who actually need it, and enforces the bargain by which freedom was 
offered as an alternative to prison or jail time. If an offender tests 
positive for drug use in this regime, a swift, short sentence is 
imposed. Ideally, drug testing would occur at least twice a week. 
CONCLUSION 
Drug use is a pleasurable activity for many people. Most have 
neither crashed a car nor dropped out of school after using drugs. 
Many have found that smoking a joint is as enticing and enjoyable as 
casually sipping on a glass of wine. For the majority of users, using 
drugs just once or twice has not resulted in great harm. But this is no 
	
109 See MARK A. R. KLEIMAN ET AL., CAL. POLICY RESEARCH CTR., OPPORTUNITIES 
AND BARRIERS IN PROBATION REFORM: A CASE STUDY OF DRUG TESTING AND 
SANCTIONS vii (2002). 
110 Id. 
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reason to legalize drugs. The minority of users who cause great harm 
to society as a whole should be our focus. 
A report from the National Research Council explained the 
situation concisely in the title of an exhaustive review of evidence-
based drug policy Informing America’s Policy On Illegal Drugs: 
What We Don’t Know Keeps Hurting Us.111 Thus, there is a pressing 
need to conduct thorough evaluations of policy interventions, and to 
implement proven interventions such as community-based prevention, 
increased intervention and treatment, drug courts, and testing and 
sanctions programs. Bringing these programs to scale should be our 
priority before any wholesale policy change, especially one as risky 
and potentially devastating as legalization. 
  
	
111 CHARLES F. MANSKI ET AL., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INFORMING AMERICA’S 
POLICY ON ILLEGAL DRUGS: WHAT WE DON’T KNOW KEEPS HURTING US (2001); see 
also Charles F. Manski, Drug Control Policy in an Uncertain World, 91 OR. L. REV. 101 
(2013) (discussing the report and experiences with statistical studies). 
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